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This short paper, based on a presentation at the LSE in December 2014, criticises the 
common opinion that ‘green growth’ offers a relatively painless - some even say 
pain-free - transition path for capitalist economies. Following a brief summary of the 
daunting arithmetic entailed in combining fast decarbonisation with continuing 
growth, the paper advances three propositions. First, market-based carbon 
mitigation programmes, such as carbon trading, cannot be sufficient and must be 
coupled with other policy pillars that foster transformative investment and 
widespread regulation. Second, a political economy of climate policy needs to draw 
on the lessons of comparative social policy research, which emphasises the role of 
international pressures, interests, institutions and ideas. Taking these into account 
gives a more realistic perspective on climate policy making in today’s neo-liberal 
world. Third, more radical policies on both consumption and production are called 
for, to ensure that carbon mitigation is not pursues at the expense of equity and 
social welfare. These include policies to restrain high-carbon luxury consumption, and 
a transition towards shorter paid working time. The conclusion is that a realistic 
programme of green growth will be immensely difficult and entail radical political 
change. 
 2 
My short answer to this question is: ‘possibly, but it will be immensely difficult and 
entail radical political change’. It is almost the opposite to Paul Krugman’s answer: 
‘saving the planet would be cheap; it might even be free’.1 Perhaps he is talking 
about another planet; certainly not this one now…. 
 
My background has been in social policy, studied and researched from different 
angles: economics, political economy, political and normative theory, and public 
policy. Six years ago I decided to devote myself to studying the interaction between 
climate change and social policy, broadly construed. This has led me into numerous 
byways but I am now writing a book to try to pull this together. I want to develop a 
perspective on the intersection between climate change and its mitigation and the 
pursuit of sustainable and equitable welfare. This would necessarily be 
interdisciplinary; hence the attraction of engaging with this group. But it certainly 
involves taking a position on ‘green growth’. I am no expert on this topic but I have 
read around it and would like to start with some comments on it, drawing on an 
earlier report written for the British Academy.2 
 
In one sense green growth is the only game in town. The only logical alternatives are, 
on the one hand, that more growth per se is the solution to dealing with climate 
change and severe environmental threats – the Bjorn Lomborg and Matt Ridley 
perspective; and on the other hand, that growth is the problem and we must move 
towards degrowth or post-growth. The first seems to me incoherent, and the second 
politically impossible. But the middle ground of green growth covers a vast terrain, 
which needs unpacking.  
 
In this brief presentation I shall concentrate on just one aspect of ‘green-ness’: the 
mitigation of climate change, but this is the most stringent current test of green 
growth. I focus on the rich world, though recognising that this cannot be divorced 
from global climate policies and the global issues of justice, need satisfaction, equity 
and governance. My research concerns the rich world within the OECD, where 
current emissions per head are several times that necessary to stabilise global 
climate.  
 
Climate change scenarios 
167 countries have endorsed the Copenhagen Accord agreeing that the safest 
maximum amount that global temperatures should be allowed to rise above the pre-
industrial revolution level is 2⁰C. Some scientists claim that this is too lenient a 
target, but let us accept it for the time being. Carbon Tracker, in collaboration with 
the Grantham Research Institute, has conducted new analysis of the total amount of 




carbon that can be burnt to achieve an 80% probability to stay below the 2°C carbon 
budgets. This came to 900 gigatonnes (billions of tonnes) of CO2 for the period from 
2000 to 2050, of which 14 years have now elapsed.3 This far exceeds present day 
usable reserves, and the cumulated burning at current trends. And as Bill McKibben 
points out, ‘”Reasonable” in this case means four chances in five, or somewhat 
worse odds than playing Russian roulette with a six-shooter’.4  
 
Yet global emissions are now accelerating, not declining - they have risen over 3% a 
year since 2000. The IPCC 2014 Synthesis Report stated: ‘Continued emission of 
greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes in all 
components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and 
irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems’.5 The World Bank warns that the 
globe is on a path to heat up by 4 degrees by the end of the century - if the global 
community fails to act on climate change. This would trigger ‘a cascade of 
cataclysmic changes that include extreme heat-waves, declining global food stocks 
and a sea-level rise affecting hundreds of millions of people’.6 And so on. 
 
The policy implications are clearly stated by Nick Stern: ‘We essentially have to go 
from around 50 billion tonnes CO2e per annum as a world now (2013) to well below 
20 in 2050. Or in per capita terms, assuming population grows from 7b now to 9b by 
2050, from 7 tonnes per capita per annum now to around 2 in 2050. But that is not 
all: assuming a global growth rate of some 2.5% pa over the next four decades, 
emissions per unit of output would need to fall by a factor of, not 3.5 but 7-8.7 All in 
35 years. And these estimates use a probability of 50% of avoiding 2 degrees: 3 
bullets in each revolver!  
 
Nick Stern recognises this as a call for a radical transformation, an energy-industrial 
revolution. This is a long way from saving the planet for free. Green growth is a huge 
challenge. His work and much of that at Grantham illustrates this. 
 
From prices to path transformation 
 
Michael Grubb’s new book, Planetary Economics, also indicates the scale of the 
conceptual challenge.8 He identifies three ‘domains’ embracing different 
conceptions of risk, different fields of theory, different economic processes and 
different implications for public policy.  









First, the dominant domain, based on neoclassical economics and optimisation 
theory, stresses the goal of pricing carbon. The policy solution to address climate 
change is to price carbon so as to impose costs on polluters and thus internalise the 
externalities they generate, and provide price incentives for sustainable energy. The 
second domain embraces low recognition of risk, satisficing, and the goal of 
improving energy efficiency; the dominant policy solutions are enforcement of 
public standards and citizen engagement. The third domain draws on evolutionary 
economics and complexity theory to prioritise the goal of economic transformation; 
the policy solution is radical innovation by large private sector organisations 
alongside strategic public planning and infrastructure investment.   
 
Grubb is adamant that all three domains must be involved if the goal is to transform 
the global energy system (his focus here). There is no magic bullet. All three are 
equally important, operating at different scales in time and space. In particular we 
must avoid, he says, the ‘ideological search’ for market solutions. Like others he is 
critical of neo-classical economics assumptions concerning rationality, equilibrium 
and its neglect of strong uncertainty. Stern’s call for an ‘energy-industrial revolution’ 
clearly fits in with this approach.9  
 
Yet Grubb’s book remains firmly within an economics framework and does not 
embrace much political economy. There is much evidence that carbon trading and 
offset schemes attract rent-seeking and gaming by corporations, financial 
institutions and other market actors.10 The EU Emissions Trading Scheme, ostensibly 
a mechanism to help regulated installations cover their CO2 emissions by trading in 
allowances, is in practice a financial market used for hedging and speculation.11 And 
political lobbying will further distort the end-results. The assumption that real-world 
policies will be optimal is unacceptable. Other critical economists, such as Terry 
Barker and Frank Ackerman, call for more interdisciplinary study of practices and 
cultures, such as those studied by sociologists of climate change, and ways of shifting 
these to lever change towards lower-carbon lifestyles.12 13 14 Only a multi-disciplinary 
approach will provide adequate policy tools for successful green growth.  
 
The politics of environmental states 
 









One of the strengths of social policy and political science analysis over the past 
quarter century has been the study of cross-national variations in welfare states, 
mainly across the OECD world.15 I am applying some of the frameworks and 
techniques developed here to the study of cross-national variations in 
‘environmental states’: states today that possess a significant set of institutions and 
practices dedicated to the management of the environment and societal-
environmental interactions – a growing area of research.16  
 
Here I use my ‘5 I’s’ framework, which I developed earlier, to bring together all the 
factors influencing the rise of welfare systems. These are: industrialisation, interests, 
institutions, ideas, and international influences.17 As with variations across welfare 
regimes, there are many conceptual problems, for example distinguishing policy 
outputs from final environmental or welfare performance. In a crude count of 
‘leader’ and ‘laggard’ countries in several recent comparative researches, Germany, 
Austria, Switzerland and the Nordic countries are regular ‘leader countries’, and the 
US, Canada and Australia are the regular ‘laggards’.  
Using my framework I advance some tentative conclusions:18 
 
 International and global influences: are important in driving the adoption of 
climate change policies. International linkages, both political and economic 
appear to favour climate action which is then spread via diffusion. This would 
appear to be a clear contrast with welfare states, which evolved within 
national contexts and are typically seen to be threatened by globalisation. 
However, ‘Cameron’s law’ still holds here: more open economies have larger 
welfare budgets, as in the European Union.  
 
 Interests: the balance of power between class interests – capital and labour – 
has proved important in explaining differences in welfare systems and 
outcomes across the OECD world, but this has little purchase on cross-
national variations in environmental programmes. However, as Robert 
Falkner has argued, divisions within capitalist groups are important. 
Countries with substantial fossil fuel reserves generate large economic rents 
and powerful constituencies wanting to defer climate action as long as 
possible; the balance between these interests and ‘green capitalist’ interests 
is important.19  
 







 Institutions: beyond some agreed political factors, such as level of 
democracy, strength of executive and partisanship, a wider range need 
investigating. These include corporatist patterns of interest representation: 
earlier studies of broader environmental legislation consistently find that the 
organisation of economic interests and the relationship between these 
interests and the government is significant.20 This supported the argument 
that coordinated market economies with social democratic welfare states 
tend to see economic and ecological values as mutually reinforcing; they are 
better placed to integrate environmental concerns alongside economic and 
social policy making.21 22 23 
 
 Ideas: can be potent mobilising or demobilising forces according to the 
dominance of special business interests and the structure of the discourse. In 
some nations, such as the US and Australia, climate change has become a 
crucial ‘ideological marker’ generating strongly polarised positions; whereas 
in countries like Germany ‘ecological modernisation’ provides a crucial 
bridging discourse. A more pessimistic factor in my view is the continuing 
ideological domination of neo-liberal ideas. There is a strong association 
between these and climate change denial.24 This was put most pithily by 
Martin Wolf: ‘To admit that a free economy generates a vast global external 
cost is to admit that the large-scale government regulation so often proposed 
by hated environmentalists is justified. For many libertarians or classical 
liberals, the very idea is unsupportable. It is far easier to deny the relevance 
of the science’.25 This could explain the relative strength of climate change 
opposition in the Anglosphere. It is a tragedy that climate change agendas 
have arisen in the era of dominant neo-liberal ideas, a denigration of state 
capacities and hostility to public initiatives.  
 
This comparative political analysis provides, I think, more understanding of the 




Reducing consumption and working time 
 








In the light of these structural factors – and there are others – the chances of 
achieving the transition arithmetic outlined above by Nick Stern sound highly 
improbable. It is not far away from the arithmetic put forward by Tim Jackson in 
Prosperity without Growth, which he used to challenge the realism of green 
growth.26 Another part of my research is to consider the arguments for restraining 
consumption in the rich world as a contribution to climate change mitigation. So let 
me turn finally to this set of issues. I accept the argument that the green growth 
revolution must take place primarily within the production domain, but that does 
not mean that consumption is unimportant. It also establishes a strong link with the 
equity and welfare components of a sustainable society. There are several strands to 
this research. 
 
First, there is mounting evidence that growth of GDP, above a certain level, does not 
deliver greater subjective wellbeing - nor various measures of objective wellbeing. I 
will not pursue that here but the evidence is now overwhelming that GDP is not a 
good indicator of human wellbeing, especially in rich economies. 
 
Second, there is a nest of distributive issues. As documented by myself and many 
others, higher incomes are the main driver of emissions within countries, as well as 
between countries. But necessities (as defined by income elasticity <1) have a higher 
GHG intensity than non-necessities; this is notably the case for domestic energy and 
food. Thus emissions as a share of income rise quite steeply as you descend the 
income scale. This immediately poses a problem for using carbon pricing as a key 
strategy for improving the greenness of growth: it is inequitable and can presents 
significant political obstacles. It is also the case that marginal GHG intensities of 
expenditure increase with lower incomes; thus income redistribution may increase 
aggregate emissions.27 This poses a further dilemma: that compensating low income 
households could undermine emissions.  
 
Third, as Henry Shue has argued, there is a normative distinction to be made 
between basic and luxury emissions: ‘It is not equitable to ask some people to 
surrender necessities so that other people can retain luxuries … The costs ought to 
be partitioned’.28 This argument was mainly advanced at the global level, but it can 
also be applied within countries. To have purchase on policy making, it requires a 
rigorous normative distinction between necessities and luxuries. In another strand of 
writing I have argued that universal basic needs can be rigorously identified in terms 
of human health and autonomy.29 On the other hand, the satisfiers to meet those 
needs will vary enormously with context, wealth and culture. Nevertheless, one can 






devise bottom-up methods to estimate these within any given national, social or 
cultural group, and these have been used to arrive at agreed measures of poverty 
and of decent living standards.30  
  
Putting these arguments together makes the case for a strategy for consumption. 
This should prioritise need-satisfiers over other preferences, non-material satisfiers 
over material satisfiers, and low-carbon satisfiers over carbon-intensive satisfiers. 
(Satisfiers include both goods and services, but also activities and relationships).  
There are various ways of doing this which I have discussed elsewhere.31 It calls for a 
more thought-through agenda around consumption. 
 
I am arguing here for a curb on consumption in rich countries like the UK as a 
contribution towards rapid decarbonisation - in other words away from green 
growth and towards planned degrowth. But is not any step along this road politically 
nonsensical? When did electorates ever support deliberately engineered declines in 
consumption and income? (‘Over the last five years’ might be one answer…). So I will 
end with a call for a transitional strategy from green growth to partial degrowth 
which I believe can work: reduced working time. 
 
I remember in introductory economics courses being taught that the productivity 
dividend can be taken in the form of increased income or increased ‘leisure’; yet, as 
Robert Skidelsky points out, this critical option rarely figures in economic analysis at 
more advanced levels.32 Reducing hours of work can reduce emissions in two ways: 
via the scale effect - reducing incomes, expenditures, consumption and emissions - 
and via the compositional effect, by altering time and expenditure budgets towards 
lower carbon intensity. Again there are marked variations between capitalist 
economies; for example, since 1975, when they had similar hours of work, the US 
has reduced average hours by 4 per cent and Germany by 22 per cent. All other 
things being equal, Germany has deployed its productivity dividend in a less 
environmentally harmful way than the United States. A cross-national analysis of 29 
OECD countries, finds that ‘annual working hours are a large and significant predictor 
of ecological outcomes’.33 34 
 
Such policies could in principle redistribute employment opportunities, enhance 
individual choice and wellbeing and save carbon. However, care would be needed to 
ensure that this policy shift would not raise other distributional dilemmas, including 
the risk of increasing poverty among the low paid, and growing ‘time inequality’ 







between the higher and lower paid.35 This is a call for new ‘eco-social policies’ that 
exploit synergies between decarbonisation and redistribution, some of which I have 
discussed elsewhere. These include the ‘reverse pricing’ of domestic energy, 
properly subsidised retrofitting programmes, and community ownership of 




I conclude briefly by reiterating that preventing dangerous climate change is an 
epochal challenge, ill-served by some comments of Paul Krugman. From social 
scientists it will require the robust inter-disciplinary approach advocated by Craig 
Calhoun, not one prioritizing market mechanisms. It will need to be integrated 
closely with social policies pursuing equity goals. And it should begin to develop a 
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